Yes, we have two inquiries...

But - and this is not something I say very often - I agree with Charles Kennedy: we're embarking on the wrong kind of inquiry.

Spending several months examining the rights and wrongs of WMD intelligence without examining the political decisions that were made - supposedly - on the back of it will be interesting, and no doubt deeply embarrasing for both government and security services at various points in time. But ultimately, it will be futile.

Instead, two very different questions need to be answered. Neither will be covered.

1. When is it right for us to invade a nation state either on humanitarian grounds, or 'on the balance of probabilities' that they pose a direct or indirect threat to us? And when not?

2. Having made the decision to go to war and carry out a regime change, did the UK and US go about it the right way?

The first is an endless debate at the heart of all foreign policy. But it's critical because it's the sort of decision we will be asked to make time and time again in the future. Incidentally, I don't buy the cynical answer 'When it's all about war'.

The second a simple matter of practicalities and logistics. But, again, it's vital. Military victory should be a breeze for the US. By 2005, its military expenditure will be more than the rest of the world combined. But this is not about military victory: this is about nation building, and infinitely more intricate business: and one the US seems most unsuited for (see the Max Hastings link below).

I have to stress, I'm not saying this because I was vehemently against the war (I was just very against charging in and leaving a place in more of a mess than we found it). But, having seen the way things have turned out, if we don't look at both of these questions closely, we are letting ourselves and our politicians off very lightly.

It's interesting how the language is changing on the issue of whether or not we should have decided to go to war, and whether the lack of WMDs makes any difference.

On the first, Colin Powell now says he might not have pushed for war, if he'd known there were no WMDs. Well sort of. But he also says: "I think it was clear that this was a regime with intent, capability and it was a risk the president felt strongly we could not take and it was something we all agreed to and would probably agree to it again under any other set of circumstances."

"Intent", "Capability", "The president FELT". This is a world of judgement calls, hunches and interpretation of possibilities. There's no problem with that, but it is not the world of certainty there was when we went to war.

Similarly in the IHT Tony Blair admits no weapons have been found so far but adds "What is untrue is to say that he is saying that there was no weapons of mass destruction program or capability, and that Saddam was not a threat."

"A program", "Capability", "Not true..that Saddam was not a threat" again, all very carefully couched. You know very well from his 'History will forgive us speech' that the real logic behind war was: Saddam might or might not be a real threat: but he's certainly making looks and smells like one, and if we get rid of him (which we think we can), it will be such a spectacular symbolic victory that frankly a few missing WMDs here or there will make no difference.

It seems clear that between the two inquiries the Intelligence forces will come under some pressure. Once they can't find it on google, the security services seem rather lost. David Kay interviewed on PBS has said: "We are not very good as a nation in our intelligence capability at reading the most fundamental secrets of a society, what are its capabilities, what are it's intentions?"

But this is the way it's going to be. It seems that in the world as it is, intelligence will never be crystal clear. It will always be a case of judgement calls. We will be very lucky (in a sense) to face situations as obvious as the invasion of Kuwait, or even Kosovo (which was still a judgement call(. We live in a much more complicated world now.

I have no problem with that. But, I have a problem with politicians who will not admit they were making the best possible decision given the information available; but prefer to sex-up that information - however subtely or 'subconsciously' - in order to suit their cause.

And whether you call it sexing up or not. It seems clear that the real issue wasn't the intelligence itself. But the very determined decision to see that information as a green light for war. To different eyes, with a different agenda, the same intelligence could easily be seen as giving a red, or at least amber light. It would have been equally possible to 'sex-down' the intelligence, and give a very good case for not going to war on the back of it. They just chose not to. But, it was, ultimately, a choice.

[Oh, and on the issue of humanitarian intervention. This paper: Kosovo and the challenge of humanitarian intervention from teh United Nations University is quite interesting.]

On the matter of whether they went about it the wrong way. Well, I've already ranted on this, and even quoted Max Hastings in the Spectator as my witness to just how wrong it's gone.

If you read any of the Iraq bloggers you can see that the US might have scored a C for invading. But, frankly would be lucky to scrape an E in GCSE nation building.

In Foreign Affairs this monthKenneth Pollack assesses the reconstruction of Iraq. He was a fierce advocate of the invasion, but now concludes:

"the current course of the U.S.-led occupation is unlikely to result in disaster. It probably will not produce a functional state and society, but it is unlikely that Iraq will simply descend into chaos -- although such a worst-case scenario cannot be ruled out.

From once so convinced the war was a good thing. This hardly reads like a ringing endorsement.